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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
OscAR W. MoYLE and

· MAY P. MoYLE,

)

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case No. 6328
vs.
SALT LAKE_ CITY, a. municipal
corpora hon,

)

Defendant arnd Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
This action was brought by Oscar W. Moyle and May
P. Moyle, his wife, against Salt Lake City to re-cover damages alleged to have been suffered by them on a0count
of the city depriving them of their water.
The backround of the matters involved in which this
litigation grows out of are as follows:
In 1848 there was constructed what is known as the
Big Cottonwood :Tanner Ditch and the waters were
diverted. through this ditch from the Big Cottonwood
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Canyon Creek for use on the lands in and around 62nd
South Street and the ·bench lands east of Murray City.
The ditch was divided into several branches, all of which
is fully illustrated 1by Exhibit I, which is a map prepared
by Mr. Towler, one ·of the City Engineers. The Big Co{
tonwood 'Tanner Ditch diverts the water from the· :f3ig
Cottonwood Creek just south of where ·6,2nd .South !Street
intersects Big Cottonwood Canyon Creek.
The water right developed through the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch was divided into 1795 units or shares,
each unit or share representing one acre of water right.
There was a corporation organized, known and designated as the Big Cottonwood ·Tanner Ditch Company
and the owners of the water rights in the Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch transferred to the ·corporation their water
rights and received a share of stock for each unit of
water right conveyed to the corporation. 8ome few of
the owners of the rights in the ditch failed to turn their
entire holdings in the Tanner Ditch to the col'lporation
with the r~sult that the major portion ·Of the water rights
of the Big :Cottonwood Tanner Ditch is owned and controlled by the Big Cottonwood 'Tanner Ditch •Company.
The plaintiffs claimed to own 22 3/4 shares of water
rights in the Big 'Cottonwood Tanner Ditch that was not
conveyed to the Big Cottonwood 'Tanner Ditch Company
and this lawsuit involves that particular water right.
After the corporation was formed and on the 22nd
day of January, 1920, a contract was entered into between the Big Cottonwood Tanner Dit10h Company and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Salt Lake City, a copy of which contract was introduced
as a part of Exhibit "A", and by the terms .of that contract the Big- ·Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company granted, conveyed and transferred to the ~City the right to
have, take and use perpetually from the Big Cottonwood
Creek in Salt Lake County all of the portions of the
water of said 'Creek to which the Big Cottonwood Tan-:ner Ditch Company is or at any time may be entitled
e:x!cept 2.591 second feet of water during the months of
April, ~Iay, June, July, August and September, and 1.436
second feet of water during the months of October, No:..
verhber, December, January, February and March, of
each year, the City to provide suitable water mains over
designated territory for the delivery of culinary water,
the City to furnish and deliver to the Company water
suitable for irrigation purposes during the months of
April, May and June of each year a quantity of water
equal to that quantity to which the Company is entitled
to take from the Big Cottonwood Creek less the culinary
water, and during the month o£ July, 30 second feet, ~rid
during the month of August, 28 second feet, and during
the month of Septemher, 26 second feet, and during the
first fifteen days of October, 15 second feet.
That in pursuance of said agreement the City constructed the water mains and pro,ceeded to deliver the
eulinary ·water in accordance with the terms of the agreement and made application (Exhibit "C") to the !State
Engineer for permission to change the point of diversion
of the waters of Big ·Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company
from the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch to the mouth of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Big Cottonwood Canyon and into the city's conduit, the
location of which is· fully shown by Exhibit I, which application was granted by the State Engineer on the
3rd day of .September, 1920.
The city constructed a pumping plant and a rpip~
line for the purpose of pumping the irrigation water
f~om the gravity flow ·canal up to the intake of the Big
'Cottonwood ·Tanner Ditch, which pumping plant was
used for the first time in 19·26. ('Tr. 269, Abs. 139) During the years 1927, 1928 and 1929 there was no foreign
water pumped into the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch.
In the year 1930 there w~s diverted into the head of the
Tanner Ditch during April, May and June Cottonwood
Creek water. During July, August and September a
small part of the water was canal water that was mixed.
('Tr. '270, Abs. 140) 'In the year 1931 during April, May
and June the water was Cottonwood Creek water. During July and a part of August and five days in September canal water was added to the creek water; also some
canal water added during the month .of October. In 1932
during April, May, June and July the water in the Big
Cottonwood ·Tanner Ditch was diverted from the Big
Cottonwood Creek with no Lake water added. From the
4th day of August and until the 15th day of October
there was some canal water added. (Tr. 270, Abs. 140)
In 1933 during April, May and June and until July
26th the water was from the .Big Cottonwood Creek that
was diverted in the Big ~Cottonwood Tanner Ditch. From
July 2~6th to August 18th a portion of the water was
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<mnal water. Frmn August 26th until the 1'5th day of
October the water was clear canyon water.
In 1934 during April, ~fny, June and July and until
August 27th the_water was Big Cottonwood ~Creek water.
From August 27th until October 15th, excepting five
days in September, the water was partly from the canal.
(Tr. 271, Abs. 141)
In 1935 during April, :Jiay, June and July and until
August lOth the water was clear water from Big Cottonwood 'Creek. From August lOth until September 2oth
there was a portion of .canal water and from the 20th ·Of
September to October 15th water ~was from Big Cottonwood Creek. (Tr. 271, Abs. 141}

In 1936, during April, May, June and July and until
August lOth the water was Big Cottonwood Creek water.
From August 11th to October 15th there was canal water
in the Tanner Ditch.
In 1937 in April, May, June and July and until
August 23rd, the water was clear water at the head of
the Tanner Ditch.
In 1938 during April, May and June and until the
28th day of July clear water was furnished to the Tanner Ditch.
In 1939 during April, May and June and until July
lOth the water was clear in the ·Tanner Ditch. From July
lOth until October 15th there rwas Lake water added.
On June 28, 1926, there wa1s a case eommenced by
8alt Lake City in the District Court of Salt Lake County
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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entitled Slalt Lake City vs. Osca,r W. Moyle a;nd May P.
Moyle, his wife, case No. 38604, plaintiff's exhibit "A'',
in whieh case it was asked by Salt Lake City that it be
allowed to take the water of the defendants, Oscar W.
Moyle and May P. Moyle, and in lieu thereof furnish to
them canal waters for irrigation and Big Cottonwood
water in the piJpeline for culinary use. Thereafter the
defendants, Oscar W. Moyle and May P. Moyle, filed a
demurrer and motion to strike. On the 2nd day of July,
1926, the court made the following order: That Salt
Lake City is authorized to take all the water of Big
Cottonwood Creek flowing into the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and return to the Big 'Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch ~water suitable for irrigation in lieu of the water
taken and that as soon as possible Salt Lake City should
in water pipes make available for the defendants, Oscar
W. Moyle and May P. Moyle, for domestic and culinary
purposes sufficient ~creek water from Big Cottonwood
Creek.
1

Nothing further was done in the case until the 2nd
day of Octoiber, 19·37, when a notice was ~served calling
up the demurrer and motion to strike, which thereafter
was regularly heard by the court and the demurrer sustained. On the 7th day of January, 1938, the following
o.rder was made in case No. 38604, "Exhibit A'':
''The court having sustained the demurrer
imposed 'by the defendants in the above entitled
case and the attorneys for plaintiff having stated
in open court that they did not desire to amend
their co·mplaint but chose to stand on their comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plaint without amendment, it,is therefore ordered
that the above entitled case be and the same is
hereby dismissed.
''Done in ·open cou:M this 7.th day of January,
A. D. 1938.

P. C. EvANS, Judge."
On the 17th day of April, 1939, the Moyles presented their claim to the Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake City, 'Claiming that the plaintiffs had been damaged in the sum of $4,150.00, plaintiff's Exhihit "B".
On July 20, 19·39, plaintiffs commenced the suit which
resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Oscar
W. Moyle and May P. Moyle, and against Salt Lake City,
from whieh judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

II.
Appellant relies on all errors assigned and will
restate the errors as they are argued in this brief and
therefore deem it unnecessary to reprint the assignments
of error collectively.

III.
The particular questions involved herein are substantially as follows :
A. Does the complaint state sufficient facts to constitute an action against Salt Lake City~
B. Can the plaintiffs recover a judgment for dam~ges in any sum other than nominal damages rwithout
proving that damages have been suffered~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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C.

~Can

the plaintiffs waive a tort and sue on an
implied contraoc.t and recover the reasonable rental value
of a water right where the \Yater has never ·been reduced
to poss,ession of the plaintiffs~
D. May you prove damages for the reasonable
rental value of property by proving that the plaintiff
believes that the property co·uld have ·been sold for some
stated amount and that the proceeds from the sale could
be loaned at a rate of interest that would appear satisfactory to the plaintiffs and then take the yield from that
multiplication or computation as the reasonable rental
value~

E. May the plaintiffs prove a reasonble rental value
by having a witness testify that the water from the average run-off over a period of eight years would amount to
a definite number of gallons and that multiplied by the
price per gallon charged for culinary use by Salt Lake
City and the result divided by 22 3/4 would give the reasonable rental value per share per year for the water
rights claimed ~by Mr. Moyle~
F.

May the court take judicial knowledge of the

fact that the water flowing from Big Cottonwood Canyon
Creek untreated is fit f.or culinary
G.

use~

May the plaintiffs, Moyles, use the culinary wa-

ter through the pipes and all the irrigation water they
need to maintain the growing of trees, shrubs and grass
on their premises and still recover the full amount ot
the rental value of their water right~
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H. May the plaintiffs recover the reasonable rental
value of the water right for the years that the evidence
conclusi,yely sho"·s there was no interference with plaintiffs' water right by Salt Lake City1

I.

~lay

a. judgment stand which is not supported
by the pleadings and the pleadings not supported ·by the
evidence1 May the judgment stand where it attempts
to order delivery of an incofiporeal right~ May a judgment order the return of ·possession of corporeal property
when the evidence shows that the city has not the property in its possession and the evidence shows that the
property is not novY in existence, that is at least under
anyone's control~

IV.
BRIEF OF ARGUMENT.
Salt Lake City's general dmnurrer that plaintiffs'
complaint did not state facts sufficient to ·eonstitute a
cause of action should have been sustained. (Assignm·ent
of Error No. 1, Abs. 164)
The plaintiffs in their complaint allege (.A!bs. 1, 2
& 3) that the defendant is a municipal corporation; that
the plaintiffs own 22 3/4 shares ·Of -vvater right in the Big
Cottonwood stream and entitled to the use thereof
through the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and that the
water right is appurtenant to plaintiffs' land situated in
Sec. 15, T. 2 IS:., R. 1 E., and that Salt Lake City on the
23rd day of July, 19'26, procured an order of the District
Court for the immediate possession of the water so owned
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the plaintiffs and that Salt Lake City on the 23rd day
of July, 1926, entered into the possession of said water
so ·Owned ·by Oscar \V. Moyle and May P. Moyle and has
held possession continuously thereof from that day until
the present time, and that on January 7, 1938, Salt Lake
City without notice to the plaintiff procured an order of
the court dismissing the a~etion in which the order of possession had :been entered and thereby terminating the
order of possession, and notwithstanding such order of
dismissal .Salt Lake City has continued to use such water
·belonging to the plaintiffs and has failed and refused to
deliver any part thereof to the plaintiffs. That the reasonable value of the use and possession of such water
so withheld and possessed by the city from the plaintiffs
from the time of the taking of possession to the time of
filing the ·complaint is the sum of $4,150.00 and that the
plaintiffs on the 17th day of Alpril, 1939, presented their
claim to the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City
in writing verified;· that by reason of all of whieh the
plaintiffs were damaged in the sum of $4,150.00 and the
plaintiffs pray judgment in that sum and for the return
to the plaintiffs of the use and possession of the water
and for their costs. There is no allegation in the complaint of any damages suS'tained or suffered by the plaintiffs.
Nor is there any allegation that the respondents
would or ·could have put the water to a ·beneficial use.
We must bear in mind the peculiar difference in a water
right and the other property rights of which we deal
with. If a man owns land or chattels he may use them
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or not as he sees fit and his failing to use them does not
give the right to someone else to use them. This is not
true with a property right which is the right to use water
from a public stream. "\Vith a water right a man must
beneficially use it or failing to do so he cannot ibe heard
to complain of someone else making a beneficial use of
the water. It has always :been the rule of law in Utah
and other arid regions that the measure of anyone's water right is "beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure and the limit of all rights to the use of w~ter
in this State.''
In the case of Falkenberg, et aL, vs. Neff, 72 Utah
258, at page 265, the court rupproves this rule:
''At such times as a prior appropriator is not
using the water under his appropriation for a
beneficial purpose such waters are considered and
treated under the doctrine of appropriations as
unappropriated public waters and for such periods
of time are su:bject to ruppropriation and use ~y
others.''
Hence the eomplaint must state that the plaintiff would
have put the water to a beneficial use during the period
in question except for the interference by the defendant.
If the theory of the complaint is to recover damages up.-:
der the allegations therein contained plaintiffs could not
recover more than nominal damages. Anna C. Rohwer
vs. Abram Chadwick, 7 Utah 382.
If the theory of the complaint is to waive the tort
and sue on an implied contract, then t?e ·complaint fails,
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a-s it is nowhere stated in the complaint that the waters
'taken were ever in the possession of the plaintiff or ever
became their personal property, and the rule of law
which permits one to waive the tort and sue on an implied •contract is where personal property is involved.
This situation was so eompletely and briefly stated in
the .case of Parks Cwnal & Mining Oompawy vs. fV. W.
Hoyt, 57 California at page 44. I feel at liberty to set
out the opinion of the court in full as follows:
·''For the purposes of this decision, it may be
admitted that water acquired .by appropriation
(1to he sold to miners' and others), by means of a
ditch leading from a natural stream, becomes,
after it has passed into the ditch, the personal
property of the appropriator. Further, it may
'be admitted, that if water be taken or diverted
from the ditch, without the consent of the 3lppropriator, he may waive the tort and bring an
action for the value of the water taken. Nevertheless, although such appropriator may be entitled
to the flow of the stream undiminished, the water
in the stream above his ditch is not his personal
property. The stream as yet flows in its natural
course~a part of the realty. The appropriator
certainly does not become the owner of the very
!body of the water until he has acquired •control
of it in conduits or reservoirs, created by art, or
applied to the purpose of leading or storing water by artificial means. It follows, that he ·cannot
maintain an action for the value of the wateras for personal property •sold and delivered against one who, without his consent, has diverted
the stream above the mouth of his ditch.
"The evidence tended to prove that plaintiff
was owner of a. ditch dug for the purpose of condu'0ting water from the Cossumnes River to Squaw
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Hollow Creek, and also of another ditch leading
from Squaw Hollow Creek, at a point below the
Cossumnes ditch. Defendant diverted walter
from the Squaw Hollow Greek at a place between
the two ditches. There was evidence that, 'at
the times the water was taken by the defendant
there was not suffitcJ.ent water in Squaw Hollow
Creek to fill the 'Squaw Hollow Creek ditch.' But
there was no evidence of the quantity of water
then running from the Cossumnes ditch into
Squaw Hollow Creek, or that any was flowing
through that ditch. For aught that appears, all
the water diverted by defendant was water naturally flowing in .Squaw Hollow Creek. If this
was the ease, it is clear, from what has been said
above, that an action for the value of the water,
as personal property, cannot be maintained. The
natural bed of Squaw Hollow Creek acquired the
·character of an artificial conduit to the extent,
and only to the extent, that the waters of the Cossumnes River flowed through it. The water
:brought to Squaw Hollow Creek by the Cossumnes
River ditch alone, if any water can be sn considered, can be -considered the personal property
of the plaintiff.
"The defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the
ground, amongst others, that 'the testimony utterly fails to show any contract, agreement, or
promise by defendant to pay plaintiff for the alleged water.' If plaintiff relies upon the promise
to pay reasonable value, which the law implies
from the wrongful taking of personal propertythe tort being waived-there is a complete failure
to prove the facts from which the promise is implied (and therefore the promise itself), since the
evidence fails to show that any personal property
was taken.
The view we have adopted renders it unnecessary to decide other questions presented. We
1

"
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may suggest, however, first, the answer does not
distinctly deny that the plaintiff was organized
.as an asso-ciation under the laws of Pennsylvania;
and second, the complaint fails to allege that the
laws of Pennsylvania gave to plaintiff the power
to sue, or any o·ther corporate power.
''Judgment and order affirmed.
'''Morrison, C. J., and Ross, J., ·concurred."
The above case was cited with approval in the case of
Salt Lake City vs. Utah & Salt La:ke Cawal Company,
and ·others, reported in 24 Utah at page 249. At page
266 the court used this language: ,,, Albove his headgates,
however, the water in the stream or lake is not his pers·onal property and he does not ·become the owner of it
until he acquires ·control of it in artifi·cial ditches or
reservoirs;" ·citing Parks Camal & Mining Co. v. W. W.
Hoyt, 57 Cal. 44.
If the theory of the complaint is to secure redress
under Se{Ytions 104..!61-10 and 11 of the Revised Statutes
of Utah, 19'33, then it again fails to state facts sufficient
to constitute a ·cause of action. The first section cited
provides the authority f.or occupation of property during
condemnation proceedings and the terms and conditions
under whi·ch order of occupa·ti·on may be granted and provides 'for the filing of a bond in the penal sum not less
than double the value of the premises and the damages
which will ensue from the condemnation in case the
property is condemned and ''to pay all damages arising
from •Occupation .before judgment in case the premises
are not condemned.'' If it is the contention of the plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tifis that their action is based on the condemnation stat·
ute, they must allege damages in order to state a cause
of action. This the comi?laint fails to do and as pointed
out hereafter in this brief the plain tiffs' counsel in .open
court disclaimed any damages, which clearly indicates
what the interpretation of the complaint is to be, that it
does not allege damages suffered hy the plaintiffs.
The majority of the cases take the view in the a•bsenoo
of statute imposing liability that as the state or subdivision thereof or a corporation on which the power of
eminent domain has been conferred in commencing a
condemnation proceeding is in the exercise of a legal
right and since every pers·on owns property subject to
the exercise of such right or privilege and the public
officers have to exercise discretion in deciding on the
use ·Of property for public purposes, the damages which
he suffers by reason of proceedings subsequently abandoned does not give rise to an action on his part but is
damnum a•bseque injuria.

D. & R. G. W. Co. vs. Mills,
147 Pac. -6-81; Ann. ~Cas. 191,6-,E, 985;
Ford vs. Parks Comrs.,
126 N. W. 1:030; Ann. Cas. 191'2-C, 940;
S'idelinker vs. Yorkshire Water Co.,
105 Atl. 122, 2 A. L. R. 327 ;

State, ex rel. St. Louis vs. Beck,
63 S. W. 2nd 814, 9'2 A. L. R. 373.

·The above rule we think does not apply in respect
to actual damages or loss suffered by the property owner
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hJit actual darn~ges must be alleged and proved and the
l9ss ·()r injury cannot be based upon spe.culative or cont.ipgent .events. Annotation 31, ·A. L. R. 364.
The complidnt in paragraph 3 states: "That in an
a:ction then pending in this court wherein the defendant
herein was plaintiff and these complaining plaintiffs were
defendants ·said Salt Lake ·City as such plaintiff pro~
cured an order of this court to he entered on the 23rd
da.y of July, 1926, for the immediate 'possession of said
water so owned 'by these plaintiffs to be delivered to said
Salt Lake City. On the said 23rd day of July, 19·26, said
Salt Lake City entered into the possession o'f said water
so owned by these plaintiffs.''
We think plaintiffs should have alleged that the city
procured a valid order for the possession of plaintiffs'
water, for if a void order or just any kind of an order
it would have no bearing on 'the case. We invite the
court's attention to plaintiffs' Exhibit "A", the court
files in the case about whi,ch the plaintiffs are complaining. 'The complaint was filed on June 28, 1926.
In paragraph 8 :of the con1plaint there is set out what
purports to be a resolution passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City on June 9, 1926. On June
28, 1926, a notice was served and filed setting the date
for hearing on the order for the 3rd day of July, 1926.
From that situation it clearly shows the court did not
. have jurisdiction. 'This jurisdictional defect is sought
to be corrected by an amendment to the complaint filed
on July 12, 192-6. This we think could not be done.
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Section 15-7-4, R.evised .Statutes of Utah, 1933, pt·ol
ddes how the city n1ay acquire water ;by eondeninatioti
proceedings, which is to the effect that the city must pass
~ resolution or ordinance and publi~h the same~ de-claring it to be deemed necessary for the public good that
the city bring condemnation proceedings. Then the city
must wait thirty days to see if any taxpayer of the city
protests the bringing of the condemnation proceedings
~nd, if one-:-third or more of the taxpayers pro,test, th~
matter must be put to an election before the city can
pr·oceed with its condemnation proceedings. ·This matter
was before the Supreme Court of the 1State o.f Utah in
case of Tremonton vs. Johnson, and.others, reported in
49 Utah, page 307.

On page 310, the court. states the

law to be as follows :
"The .general rule is that where the statute
prescribed the procedure or steps to be taken by
a municipal corporation in exercising the right
of eminent domain, the procedure prescribed. hy
the statute bec.omes a matter o.f substance and
must be strictly followed by. the condemnor as
against the owner of the property sought to be
condemned. It is further held that where the
statute prescribe certain steps to be taken before
initiating condemnation proceedings, such steps
are jurisdictional and may not be disregarded.'~
On page 311, the court quotes with a1pproval from
Whitehead vs. Denver: s~

Pae' 913

"It is held that where a statute requires certain things to be done hy a munioipality before
initiating condemnation proceedings, things reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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quired to be done ·Bonstitute a condition precedent
to the rights to institu.te the proceedings and must
be .alleged and proved.''
We think the amendment to the complaint was of
no consequence. Lewis vs. Fox, 54 Pac. 823. Quoting
from page 826 :

''':It is said by respondents, however, that 'the
deprivation of the thirty inches of water from the
artesian wells, and ouster from the same reason
of the foreclosure and sale and sheriff's deed
under the Donovan mortgage, is pleaded in their
supplemental cross complaint.' But this does not
aid rt:he original cross complaint. The cause of
action must exist when the action-commenced by
the cross eomplaint___.)was brought. If a suit be
brought upon a promissory note before it !becomes
due, the com~laint would not be aided by a supplemental ,eomplaint filed after it became due, alleging its maturity at a date subsequent to the
·commencement of the action.''
In the case of Keeler vs. Parks, 130 Pac. 111, at page
113, the eourt said :

''The m·otion for a judgment dismissing the
action upon the pleadings was properly sustained.
The pleadings ·show that the action was premature.
A state of facts that had not ripened into a cause
of action when the suit is commenced cannot be
supplemented by a class of facts that came into
being later so as to make a cause of action."
The court never having had jurisdiction in the matter could not make an order and any order the court
made was a nullity. In the case of State vs. Ba.tes, 22
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Utah 65, 61 Pa·c. 905, quoting from the opinion at page
906:

·• A void judgment is really no judgn1ent. It
leaYes the parties litig·ant in the same position
they were in before the trial. It leaves them in
exactly the sam~ position as if no trial had taken
place. Such a judgment confers authority upon
no one to enf.orce it. 'A void judgment,' says Mr.
Black, •is in reality no judgment at all. It is a
mere nullity. It is attended hy none of the eonsequences of a valid adjudication, nor is it entitled
to the respect accorded to one. It can neither
affect, impair, nor create rights. As to the pers·on against whom it professes to he rendered, it
binds him in no degree whatever ; it has no effeet
as a lien upon his property; it does not raise an
estoppel against him. As to the ·person in whose
favor it professes to be, it places him in no better
position than he occupied hefore; it gives him
no new right, but an attempt to enforce it will
place him in peril. As to third persons, it cam
neither be a source of title, nor an impediment in
the way of enforcing their claims. It is not necessary to take any steps to have it reversed,
vacated, or set aside. But, whenever it is br·ought
up against a party, he may assail its pretensions
and show its worthle·ssness. It is supported by no
presumptions, and may he impeached in any action, direct or collateral.''
In the case of Minnesota Thrasher Man~t/acturing
Oo. vs. L. 'Heureua;, 118 N. W. 565, at page 5·66, the court
says:
"Now a void judgment is in reality no judgment at all. It is a mere nullity. It is attended
by none of the consequences ·of a. valid judgment,
nor is it entitled to respect accorded to one~ · It
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can neither aff~ct, impair, nor create rights. As
to the person against whom it proposes to be
rendered, it binds him in no degree whatever."
.·This last pr.oposition urged as a grounds for the complaint not stating a cause of action is equally appurtenant to the assignmeruts of error Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15 and 17.
Assignment of Error No. 17 is that the court erred
in admitting in evidence plaintiffs' Exhibit "A" .
. AssiGNMENTs OF 'ERROR Nos. 2, 3 AND 4--ABSTRACT 165.
Assignment of Err•or No. 2 challenges the correctness of Finding of Fact No. 2 wherein the court found
that the plaintiffs were the owners of 22.75 shares of
water right in the Big Cottonwood stream. Assignment
of Error No. 3 ·challenges finding of fact No. 3 wher·ein
the ·court found that on the 23rd day of July, 1926, Salt
Lake City procured an order of court for the immediate
'possession of the plaintiff's water, and in accordance
with the order entered into the pos·s.ession of the said
water and has ·continuously had and held the possession
thereof from the 23rd day of July until date of trial.
Assig.nment of Error No. 4 challenges the finding of fact
N·o. 4 wherein the court finds that Salt Lake City has
continued to and does now use water belonging to the
plaintiffs and has failed and refused to deliver any part
thereof to the plaintiffs or either of them. The above
three assignments of error will .be argued together.
There is no evidence in the cas.e that the M·oyles or
either of them are the owne'rs of 22 3/4 shares of water
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right in the Big Cottonwood streafu.· Mrs. Oscar W.
Moyle testified (abstract 26, trans•cript 58) that h~ owned
22 3/4 shares of the total flow of the Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch Company, which I think the witness meant
to say, 22 3/4 shares o'f the total flow of the Big Cottonwood 'Tanner Ditch. Nowhere in his testimony does he
testify that he owned 22 3/4shares of water right in the
Big Cottonwood stream. In plaintiffs' complaint, para-.
graph 2, the plaintiff.s claim to be the owners of 2·2 3/4
shares of water right in the Big Cottonwood stream itnd
entitled to the use thereof through the Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch. We submit that thisfinding is erroneous
and absolutely contrary to the evidence. It may he urged
that the defendant, >Salt Lake City, knew or ought to have
known that the plaintiffs meant to say that they owned
22 3/4 shares of water right in the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch. This, however, I think would ibe un'fair to the
City, and eondones poor pleading to the prejudice of the
defendant.
If the plaintiffs, the Moyles, had alleged the facts
in their complaint in a,.ccordance with the testiimony giv.en
by Mr. Moyle, the City would then have had the opportunity to have denied the fact as alleged and to have.
put in issue the ·extent of the right which Mr. Moyle testi:-,
fied that he owned in the Big Cottonwood 'Tanner·Ditch,
but with the allegation of .the Complaint as

it is, this

issue could not be raised.
In finding of fact No. 3 where the court find~ that
the City entered into. possession of the water of ·plain..:'
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tiffs, the Moyles, and had continued to hold possession
thereof from .the 23rd day of July, 1926, until date of
trial, is contrary to all the evidence in the case. In the
first place, there is no evidence that the City ever had'
possession of any water owned 'by Mr. Moyle. The finding of fact indicates that the ·court believed that Moyle
had .actual possession of the ·corpus of the water and that
the City took the water from his posse·ssion, and there
is not one scintilla. .of evidence in the re-cord to that effect.
The evidence does show that at some periods during the
tim·e in questlion the City diverted the Big Cottonwood
Creek stream of water from its natural channel at the
mouth of Big Cottonwood 1Canyon, and placed it in the
Salt Lake City conduit; but the evidence conclusively
shows ·that that was £or only a. short period of each of
the year·s in question, and that it oceurred the first time
in 1926; that in 1927, 19•28, and 1929 there was no interference at any tin1e of the year by Salt Lake City with
any water right of Oscar W. Moyle and May P. Moyle.
The exa•ct dates and length of time that the City interfered with the natural flow of the Big Cottonwood Creek
are specified in Mr. 'Towler's testimony (Abs. 139, 140,
141; Tr. 269, 270, 271, 272) and the evidence shows that
Mr. Moyle used the water as freely during the period
in controversy as at any other time.
The testimony of Mr. Horace T. Godfrey ('Tr. 219;
,&bs: 126) and George F . .Smith ('Tr. 259; Abs. 136} who
were the water master·s of the Big Cottonwood Tanner
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.~

Ditch duriiJlg the time in question each testified that as
water masters they issued a card to each of the water
users, sho"Wing the time to take the water and the number of hours they would be permitted to use it, and these
eards were delivered to Mr. Oscar W. Moyle the same
a·s other water users of the Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch, all of which is more fully explained and shown by
E·xhibits 4, 5, 6, and 7 (Testimony of Mr. Godfrey, Abs.
127-132 inclusive).
There is no evidence in the case that Salt Lake City
did any act or acts pursuant to any order of any court.
There is no evidence in the case, in fact the evidence is
to the contrary, that no order of a ·court was ever served
on the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company, or on
McDonald, the eourt commissioner of the Big Cottonwood ·Canyon Creek, directing either of them to deliver
the water under their jurisdiction to 18alt Lake City, nor
any evidence that either of them were directed by any
court to deliver allly water belonging to Os,car W. Moyle
and his "Wife to Salt Lake Ci·ty.

There is no evidence

that Oscar W. Moyle and May P. Moyle were ever enjoined or restrained from using any water.
Findings .of Fact N·os. 2, 3 and 4 are wholly unsupported by the evidence and are contrary to the undisputed evidenee which shows that for the larger portion
of each year, and during the entire time ·Of four of the
years the water ran in the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch
undistui'tbed and undimim.ished by Salt Lake City.
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A~s~GNl\fENT OF ERROR

No.

5___,ABSTRACT

166.

The oourt in its finding of fact No. 5 found that the
reasona ble value of the use and possession of the water
is the sum o'f $4,150.00, and from the time of filing the
complaint to the time of judgment the sum of $350.00,
which, together with interest at the rate of 67o makes a
total damage to the plaintiffs in the sum of $4,7·69.75.
This finding is contrary to the evidence and is not supported by the evidence. There isn't one sdntilla of evidence in the record that Oscar W. Moyle arnd May P.
Moyle or either of them suffer·ed any damage, and their
attorney in open court ( A'bs. 148) disclaimed any damages :Bor any dimunition of water after 1'926.
1

How could the court then find .any substantial damages had ;been suffered by them, and give to the Moyles
a judgment as the court did~ How could the Moyles
have a water right and he deprived of it without suffering damages~ The fact is that they either had no water
right beeause they had not been putting water to beneficial use, or if they had been using the water beneficially,
then they eontinued to re1eeive the water and use it, or
they would have 'bet!n damaged.
There is no .competent testimony in the re·cord that
$15.00 per year per share is a reasonable rental value.
Mr. Moyle testified (Abs. 37 and 38):
'' Q. What in your judgment would be the
V[tlue of the water represented by the '22 3/4
shares not in the corporation and which the city
obtained its order for possession on July 23, 1926,
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what would be the reasonable value for the use
of that water during that timeol
"Since the year 192G there has been very
s1nall quantities of Big Cottonwood Creek Water
available to people in that community. The only
water that is availa:ble to them for culinary purposes comes to them through the pipes belonging
to Salt Lake City.
'·' Q. And you know what the \ralue of that
water coming through the pipes of Salt Lake is
in that vicinity ?

''A. Yes.
''A. I would say $15.00 per share per year
is as near as I cam figure its value."
In my humble opinion that would not furnish any
basis upon \Yhich the court ·could find that $15.00 per
share per year was a reasonable rental value, as the evidence shows that the \Yater right which :Hr. Moyle claims
is a fractional part of the North ·branch of the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch, which he receives by way of a
water turn about once a \Yeek, and that the water as it
comes down naturally from the Big Cottonwood Creek,
and that the water as it cnmes down fr·om Big Cottonwood Creek is unfit for culinary use without being first
treated, and that kind of a water right has no relation
to the value of culinary water piped to a residence, treated so as to be fit for culinary use and in a pressure pipe
so it ·can be used in conjunction with modern household
conveniences.
The other witness who testified for the Moyles as to
rl'utal value was Mr. Wyler, a civil engineer, who testiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fied that he took the total flow for the entire year for
which the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch would be entitled to, and then to·ok the amount of that which Mr.
Moyle wou1d be entitled to and took the average of that
quantity for the past eight year·s and calculated the number of gallons of water that would be the average yield
and then divided that quantity in half and multiplied
that result by the price per gallon which Salt Lake City
charges for water delivered through its water mains in
the City, and dividing that sum by 22 3/4 shares gave
the figure at which he said was the reasonable rental
value per share per year. That isn't any evidence of the
reasonable rental value or of any value of any vmter.
·There was nothing in his testimony that couldn't have
been calculated by the court ·Or by any Sixth grade pupil
who -could multiply, sn:bstract and divide ordinary
arithmetic problems. There isn't any evidence ~n the
record that Mr. Moyle had a ·0ontinuous flow right. The
evidence is to the contrary.
There isn't any evidence nor any pleading that Mr.
Moyle could have sold his water, which he claimed the
right to receive, for culinary use, and no evidence as to
what the cost would be to reduce it to posses·sion, treat
and ·chlorinate it, pipe it to prospective ·customers, and
collect the rents. All of it is too speculative and imaginative to be given credit by a court as to the reasonable
rental value of a water right.
All we have said concerning assignment of error No.
5 applies equally to assignment of error No. 6, which
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assigns as error finding of fact No. 7, wherein the court
found that the Moyles had been damaged in the sum of
$4,769.75. There is no evidenc-e that the plaintiffs or
either of them suffered any damage, and as has been
pointed out, they, through their attorney, in open court,
disclaimed any right to recover any damages, claiming
that th~y were not seeking damages and did not attempt
to allege or prove any damage>S, and this assignment of
error is also supported by the ·eases cited in support of
assignment of error No. 1.
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

No.

6----ABsTRACT

167.

The court erred in its finding of fact No. 7 wherein
the court finds that plaintiffs have been damaged in the
sum of $4,769.75. This is ·coJlltrary to the evidence and to
the claim of plaintiffs, who stated that they were not
claiming damages. Bearing in mind that the plaintiffs
in their complaint are seeking a judgment eovering a
period from July 23, 19'26 to date of filing complaint, and
the only claim they make is for an equal amount each
year for that period, that is, reasonable rental value for
their water right; and the evidence conclusively show's
that in the years '27, '28 and '29 there was no interference with their water right, but notwithstanding that th~
court gives them judgment as prayed for covering the
entire period from July 23, 1926 to date of trial.
What would be the prope·r measure for the reasonable rental value .of the water right~ Assuming, but not
admitting, that the plaintiffs were entitled to a reasonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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able rental V alue, it surely would· not ·beth~ rental'value
for the highest duty the water .could be put to, but :could
only 1be the reasona.ble rental value for the use to which
the water had been put to, which was for irrigation purposes ; and the plaintiffs did not introduce any testimony
pretending to prove the reasonable rental value of a water right used for irrigating trees and shru'hs. The court
did not take into consideration any beneficial use that the
plaintiffs received from the water furnished them through
the culinary pipes or the clear ~canyon water which was
permitted to run to them part of every year, and all of
some years, nor did the court consider the reduction in
loss, if any, which the plaintiff sustained, by recognition
of the lake water whieh was pumped into the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch during a part of some of the years.
1

Mr. Moyle'·s testimony is that he used culinary water
from the pipe which was supplied by Salt Lake City since
the year 1921, the year the pipes were placed in front
of his place. Hence the plaintiffs could not have had any
water rights of any kind during the non-irrigation season. He had not been aipply~ing any water to bene.ficial
use after 1921 for a culinary purpose. He testified that
the water was piped into his home and also into his corral and that he watered his livestock and lawns from the
culinary pipeline.
The evidence shows by all of the witnesses that Mr.

1

Moyle took his regular water turn in accordance .with
the ~cards issued him iby the water masters, saving and
excepting . two.' .,years when . water master Godfrey was
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directed not to time the 22 3/4 shares of water right to
Mr. Moyle.
The order of the court, plaintiffs' Exhibit "A", of
which the ~Ioyles complained, provided among other
things, "'ordered that as soon as possible plaintiffs shall
in ''ater pipes furnish to or make available for defendants for domestic and culinary purposes sufficient creek
water from Big Cottonwood Creek," thereby sho·wing
that the -city did not get an order for the taking of all
of ~Ioyles' "-ater and under Section 104-61-11, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, the ·court in making up its findings should take into consideration the value of the portion not sought to be condemned and how much benefit
the Moyles ·would derive by the delivery of culinary water in the pipes to the Moyle's premises. This provision
of the statute the court ignored in its findings and in
making up the judgment for damages.
By the complaint of Salt Lake City 1n case No.
38604, naming as defendants Oscar W. Moyle and May

P. Moyle, if the city .sought to take by the law of
eminent domain water in the Big Cottonwood Creek and
substitute therefor Utah Lake water. (Par. 10, Exhibit
"A"). The complaint was filed June 28, 1926, and a
general and special demurrer was filed by the defend-:ants on July 16, 1926. On the 23rd ·of July, 1926., the
court granted its order authorizing the city to take
possession of the said water of Big Cottonwood Creek
flowing in the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and to turn
into the· Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch other water ·Suit.:.
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ablefor irrigation in lieu and in place of the Big Cot.
tonwood Creek water s'o taken therefrom. (See File
38604, Exhibit "A").
The above referred to order was never reviewed
or otherwise assailed by the defendants except that de.
fendants ·called up the demurrer above mentioned for
argument some eleven years later on October 8, 1937,
and the court sustained the demurrer and thereafter on
January 7, 1938, ordered the complaint of plaintiff in
said case No. 38604 to he dismissed. The city thereupon
abandoned is action in case No. 38604 and did not further
seek to condemn said water.
In the event that the plaintiff claims his right in the
present action under the law of eminent domain his
damages must be recovered in the acti1on, case No. 38604,
either f.or a taking in the event of eondemnation or f.or
damages arising from the occupation or possession of the
property before judgment in case the premises are not
condemned in accordance with Section 104-61-11, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933.
In the event, however, that plaintiff is suing in tort
or has waived the tort and is suing on an implied contract, then no suit would lie against Salt Lake Ci•ty unless
a claim is filed a·s is required by ·the pr,ovisions of
Section 15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. Further, said claim must he filed in the manner and within
the time required by the provisions of said ,section.
Apparently plaintiff's theory was that he wa·s suing
either in tort or implied' 'contract because he made no
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attempt to obtain damages in the case, No. 38604, above
referred to, and he filed a claim in an attempt to· comply
with the provisions of Section 15-7-76 above. However,
the claim referred to in said section of the statute must
be filed within one ye-ar after the accrual of the cause
of action. If the plaintiff i.s suing in tort or for an
implied contract, his cause of action accrued when the
order of dismissal of the action was entered. Therefore, the claim under said statute must have been filed
within one year from January 7, 1938. The claim was
filed on April17, 1939, one year and three months after
the accrual of the action.
Now another point of view.

If the order of pos-

session in case No. 38604 was void, then no action can
be maintained £or any of the year.s from July 23, 1926,
to April17, 1938, for rthe reason that each of those years
would constitute a separate transaction and no claim was
filed for any alleged damage pursuant to said section
15-7-76, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, until April
of 1939.
The right to institute an action in this class of case.s
against a municipal corporation is purely statutory. It
did not exist at common law and therefore the condition
precedent fixed by the said Section 15-7-76 must be com..
plied with, or the action fails.

Hurley v. Bingharm,
63 Utah 589, 228 Pac. 213.
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· ·' It is ·within ·the ··power of the legislature to impose
such ~conditions upon the right to .sue cities and towns,
which are merely arms of the state government, as in
its judgment may seem wise and proper, and the conditions which are thus imposed are conditions precedent
and cannot be ignored either by the claimants or by the
eourt · '

Berger v. Salt Lake City,
~Utah 403, at 408, 191 Pac. ~~g3

.Ci.

AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

No.

8-ABSTRACT

169.

This assignment of error challenges finding of fact
No. 9 which finds that the plaintiff,s, the Moyles, had
not abandoned their water right nor any part thereof.
This finding of fa:ct is not supported by the evidence
and is contrary to the evidence.
Mr. Moyle testified (Abs. 43. Tr. 90) :

"Q. What you used it £or principally was to
irrigate the trees and shrubs and bushes and
things growing on that tract of land~
"A. Principally, yes.
there for some years.''

I had a little garden

He further testified (Tr. 84; Abs. 39) that he had built
his new house in the year 1923 and provided it with
culinary water piped for the upstairs and downstairs
and .conne-cted to the main line-s that were put in in front
of his place by the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and
Salt Lake City; and that he has ever ·since used culinary
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water, from that source for his ·house, sprinkling his
lawn, and watering· his horses, and ·there is no evidence
in the record which proves or tends ·to prove any other
use, so that giving Moyle full credit for all of his
li;estimony :he only had a water right for ·irrigation during
the irrigation season from the Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch, and that his culinary water was received through
the water mains laid by Salt Lake City.
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

No. 9.

This assignment of error challenges finding of fact
No. 9, which is to the effect that the water involved
in this case is the same a:s that decreed to Oscar W.
Moyle in the case of Progress Company vs. Salt Lake

City, et al., 53 Utah 5·56, 173 P:ac. 705. This finding is contrary to the facts as pointed out in the argument to assignment of error No. 8, that the evidence shows the
extent of the water right which Mr. Moyle claims and
that is the only water right which Mr. Moyle could claim;
and there is no evidence in the Teeord as to what the water
right was in the case of Progress Company vs. Salt Lake
Ci~ty.

This finding of fact is not responsive to any issue

in the case. There was no allegation in plaintiffs' complaint regarding the water right whFch Mr. Moyle owned
in the Progress C ompwny vs. Salt Lake City, and as this
court po~inted out in the case of Shurtliff~ et al., vs. Salt
Lake City, 96 Ut. 21, that evidence without pleadings was
of no coni;;equence.
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There is no purpose in finding No. 9. Whether the
water right which Mr. Moyle owns is the same as that
water right de·creed to him in the Pflogre.ss case is
wholly immaterial. The only question before the court
is, what is Mr. Moyle's water right~ And this court has
repeatedly held, and the state statute declared the law
to be ·that beneficial use is the measure of the right of a
water right in this state.
This finding, if permitted to stand, is prejudicial to
the City, in this, that it purports to find a water right
or a fact against Salt Lake City in accordance with a
historical document, without the matter having been
placed in issue to determine whether it is or is not a
fact, and makes the judgment and decree ambiguous in
that any officer of the law attempting to enforce the
judgment would have to peruse the records of the Third
District Court to determine for himself what this decree
purported to declare the wa:ter rights of Mr. Moyle to be.
AssiGNMENT

OF ERROR

No. 10.

This assignment of error challenges the correctness
of the conclusi•on of law which the ·Court drew concluding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment in
the sum of $4,7·69.75,and for the return to said plaintiffs
of the possession and use of said wateT and the whole
thereof.

What we have said concerning the assign-

ments of error No. 1 to 6 inclusive and 8 and 9 applies
with equal force to assignment of error No. 10 insofar
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.as the rendition of the judgment in the sum of $4,769.75
is concerned.
Here again the court seems to have assumed that
the ~Ioyles had possession of the corpus of the water
and that Salt Lake City took the per.sonal property, the
very corpus of the "~ater from the possession of the
~Ioyles. There is no evidence in the case from which
the ·court could so conclude. All of the evidence shows
conclusively that the City did not have possession of
Moyle's water and that ~Ioyle did not have possession of
the corpus of the water.
How could the court enter a conclusion of law concluding that the plaintiffs were entitled to the return
of the possession and use of their water~ There is no
evidence that Mr. Moyle or his wife had any water. The
evidence is that they claim to have a water right, ·or that
is to say, a right to use water, and they claim that the
City interfered with their right of use; and the only
legal thing the court could do would be by way of enjoining the City from interfering with plaintiffs' right to use
water, if such issue had been put in issue by the pleadings, which it was not, and hence was not before the
court.
The court apparently proceeded on the theory of
replevin, directing the return of personal property.
There is no evidence in the record that the City has
taken any water from Mr. Moyle and stored it in any
particular place where the court could order a return of
the water, .and hence such a ·Conclusion is wholly erSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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roneous and prejudicial to the defendant Salt Lake City;
to decree that the City do s:omething which the evidence
show.s it could not do; it has not the power, not having
the possession of any personal property belonging to the
Moyle·s.
AssiGNMENTS OF ERROR No. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
AND 16-ABSTRACT 171-176 INCLUSIVE.

The·se assignments of error are as follows:

11.
The court erred in entering its judgment herein in
fav-or of the plaintiffs and against the appellant f:oT the
reason that the great preponderance of the evidence
established all material facts in favor of the defendant
and contrary to the plaintiffs and that under the law
defendant was entitled to a judgment in its favor. (Tr.
27; Ahs. 13).

12.
The court erred in entering its judgment, to the
effect that the plaintiffs have and recover from the
defendant Salt Lake City 1the sum of $4,7,69.75 and shall
have and recover of and from the said defendant the
use and possession of the water from the Big Cottonwood stream described as 22% shares ·of water right in
the Big Cottonwood stream and the appellant specifies
that there is no evidence in the record from which the
court could conclude. to find or enter its judgment that
the plaintiffs were ~ntitled to that amount of money.
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And appellant specifies that there is no evidence in the
reoord.to indicate that Salt Lake City has possession of
the plaintiff's water and therefore could not be subject
to a judgment to return possession of something of which
it has not the possession and appellant specifies that· the
evidence conclusively shows that any water rights Mr.
~loyle has or claims are water rights in the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and not in the Big Cottonwood
stream and there is no evidence in the recor-d which
shows that plaintiffs, Osear W. Moyle and wife, are the
owners of 22% shares of water right in the Big Cottonwood .stream. (Tr. 27; Abs. 13).
13.
The Court erred in enter-ing its judgment and
decree, wherein it adjudged and decreed that the plaintiffs' water rights were the same water as that decreed
to Oscar \V. M·oyle, in the .case of Progress Company
vs. Salt Lake City, and in paragraph 7 of the decree
in the case of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Compam;y
vs. Vilncent Slvurtliff, et al., and appellant specifies that
there is no evidence in the record to p:r:ove that the water
rights claimed by Mr. Moyle at the date of this hearing
were the .same as the water rights decreed to him in the
case mentioned. In fact, the evidence is all to the contrary. (Tr. 28; Abs. 14).
14.
. The court erred in entering its decree in the form
and manner in which it is drawn in this respect, that
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the decree or judgment other than the amount therein
specified is .so indefinite and uncertain, ambiguous and
meaningless that it should be held for naught, and the
appellant specifies that the decree could not he enforced
as no officer of the law could tell where to find or how
much water 22}4, shaTes of water right in the Big Cottonwood stream in Salt Lake Couruty, Utah, is. No other court
could determine whether or not this judgment was being
violated or c-omplied with, and appellant specifies that
no law enforcing officer could take the judgment and
determine whether or not the water right litigated in
this case is the same as the water right adjudicated in
some other case without going beyond the judgment .of
this case and taking the testimony to determine what
this judgment might mean. ( Tr. 28, 29; Abs. 1'5).
15.

The trial court erred in overruling and denying
defendant's motion for a new trial:
1.

Excessive damages having been g1ven.

2. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision and judgment, and ·the judgment being against law,
there · being no competent evidence in the record t()
justify or support the Findings ·of Fact and Conclusions
of Law or Judgment. ( Tr. 31 ; Abs. 15).

16.
T·he trial court erred in overruling and denying
defendant's motion for a new trial:
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(a) For the reason that there is no evidence
in the record which proves or tends to prove that
the -plaintiff·s or either of then1 suffered any damages or were injured in any n1aterial way by
any ,conduct of commission or omission of Salt
Lake City.
(b) The evidence shows that without contradiction the plaintiffs have abandoned any water
right or right to use ,water from Big Cottonwood
Creek or the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch during the \\inter season and notwithstanding this
evidence the court granted judgment to plaintiffs
for an interference with plaintiffs' water rights
during the entire year.
·
(c) The evidence conclusively shows that the
plaintiffs used water from the Big Cottonwood
.: .." Tanner Ditch and all the water they desired to
use without any hindrance or interference of the
defendant Salt Lake City.
(d) Appellant specifies that there is no evidence in the record from which the court could
conclude or find that Salt Lake City was under
any obligation to deliver any water to the plaintiffs or either :of them.
(e) And appellant specifies that the court
·erroneously gave judgment in the sum of $350.00
for damages from the time of filing the complaint
to the time of judgment, and there is no evidence
proved or claim that the plaintiffs or either of
them suffered any damages during the period of
time and there is no evidence in the record that
the plaintiffs or either of them filed any claim
with Salt Lake City claiming damages for that
period of time, and appellant specifies that there
is no competent evidence from which the court
could enter its judgment to the effect that the
plaintiffs or either of them had .suffered damages
in the sum of $4,769.7:5. The evidence conclusively
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show.s that the plaintiffs did not suffer any damage.
(f) And the evidence shows that the plaintiffs ·Claimed and re-ceived damages for twelve
years, when in law they could not receive judgment for damages received beyond four years
from the date of filing their complaint.
(g) And appellant specifies that the court
gave its judgment for an all year round use of
water, when the evidence conclusively shows that
the plaintiffs have abandoned any water right or
the right to the use of the water from Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch during the non-irrigation
season.
(h) Appellant ·Specifies that the decision is
against law in this, that the evidence shows that
plaintiffs were benefited and received a larger
amount of water, both culinary and irrigation
water, than they could have received had it not
been for the exchange agreement with Salt Lake
City.
(i) And the appellant .specifies that the court
could not grant judgment giving the plaintiffs the
right to recover from Salt Lake City the possession uf a water right from the Big Cottonwood
stream described as 223,4 shares, as a water right
is not a subject of replevin and the water is gone
and could not he replevied, and it is contrary to
law for the court to is.sue an injunction or adjudicate an injunction without it being based upon the
pleadings and evidence to support the pleadings.
(j) And appellant specifies that the court
erred in failing to take into consideration the duty
of the plaintiffs to mitigate their dmnage, if any
they sustained, and the court failed to take into
·Consideration the fact that the evidence showed
that in a portion of the time involved in this litigation the water flowed down the Big Cottonwood
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Tanner Ditc.h uninterfered .with in any way, shape
or form by Salt Lake City. (Tr. 31 to :~4; Abs.
15).
The arg·uments and authorities cited in support of
assignments of error Xo. 1 to 10 inclusiYe, are equally
pertinent to assignn1ents of error 11 to 16 inclusive, and
we submit them on the arguments already made, with
this addition.
How could the decree which the court ·entered be
enforced~ No officer or court could tell where to find or
how much water :223;! shares of water right in the Big
Cottonwood stream in Salt Lake County, Utah is. What
amount of water is that~ How would the court determine when the judgment or decree in the instant case
had been complied with~ How eould anyone read the
decree in the instant case and know whether or not it was
complied with or violated? How ·Could the court determine what a reasonable rental value for 22% shares :of
water right in the Big Cottonwood stream would be
worth~

Lost Creek Irrigation Co. vs. Ren, et al.,
26 Utah 485.
The evidence not only shows that the plaintiffs suffered no damage.s, but on the contrary, proves that the
Moyles were materially benefitted by the additional
water that was made available to them by

re~son

of

the City furnishing more water under the contract of
exchange agreement than would have been without the
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contract, and the compliance with it on the part of Salt
Lake City.
The testimony of Richard C. Towler (Abs. 142 to
144 inclusive) and exhibit 9 shows the quantity of water
that Moyle would have received under his claim right
and the mnount of water whi·ch he actually did receive.
This testimony is uncontradicted, and demonstrates that
the Moy les were benefitted and not damaged.
The court erred in not granting defendant a new
trial. (As-signments of Error Nos. 15 and 16). The
evidence establishes the following facts :
1. That from 1926 to date of trial the water has been
delivered to the Moyles in the same manner that it was
in aU previous years. It is interesting to note that in
paragraph 4 of plaintiffs' eomplaint they allege that
notwithstanding the order of dismissal Salt Lake City
has •continued to and does now use such water belonging
to the plaintiffs and the evidence shows that the water

had been handled in the same manner from the inception
of the exchange agreement up to the date of the trial,
which demonstrates that the ·Conduct of the parti·es was
not governed by the order :of the ·Court.
2. The evidence shows that the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company was decreed the right to distribute
the water of the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch to the
stockholders as well as to the owners of water rights
who were not in the corporation. (Def·endant's exhibit
2, files in case No. 14230.) (Abs. 87).
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,3. The evidence shows that the Big Cottonwo·od Tanne;r Ditch .Company was never directed by the court or
~()ne

else to cease delivering water ·to Oscar W. Moyle.

4..The evidence (witness Towler) is conclusive that
the water d€livered to :Moyle during the period of 1926
until 1930 was clear mountain water ·coming from the
Big Cottonwood ~Canyon Creek and thereafter for only a
short period of time during irrigation season was there
any Lake warter co-mingled with the walter of the Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch.
5. The evidence dem:onstrated that during the period
in question Moyle actually used his full term as allotted
to him by the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company,
including the 22% shares in question. (Witnes.ses Godfrey and Smith).
6. It i.s uncontradicted that there was an abundance
of clear chlorinated water piped to Mr. Moyle's property and three large openings from the eity mains connecting with the Moyle property and that he had used
all the clear water he desired through these connections
which were unmetered and under a pressure of approximately thirty pounds.

7. The evidence shows that the court taking judicial
knowledge of the character of the water flowing in Big
Cottonwood Creek was improper and contrary to the
evidence in the case and demonstrates that the court was
biased and prejudiced against the defendant Salt Lake
City.
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8. The evidence shows that the users of water under
the Big Oottonwood Tanner Ditch have not used the
winter water for eulinary or domestic purposes since
the pipes were put in ther·e by Salt Lake City about
the year 1921.
9. There is no evidence in the record which prove·s
or tends to prove any need ·or use for water on the Moyle
lands during the winter months f:or any purpose other
than culinary.
10. The ·evidence eon-elusively shows that the Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company has furnished more
water for il"l'igation and growing 'Plants, trees and

~rops

than would have been received had it not been for the
exchange agreement. (Witness T:owler).
11. The evidence shows that the plaintiffs, Oscar W.
Moyle and wife, have not been damaged in .any way, have
suffered no monetary loss by reason of any conduct of
Salt Lake City, but on the eontr.ary the evidence shows
they have been benefitted by having received more water
for culinary, domestic and irrigati:on purposes than they
could or would have received under their elaimed rights
had it not been for the actions of Salt Lake City and
the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company.
T·he plaintiff, Mr. Moyle, filed ·a protest in the State
Engineer's ,office, dated June 20, 1938, and while he was
on the witness stand he was asked if the following from
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that protest was eorrect, which he stated it was, quoting
from the protest :
"3. That protestant has at present use and
prospective use for all of his said Big Gottonwo:od
water for culinary, residential and .stock watering
purposes, and has no use for the Utah Lake or
Jordan water proposed to be substituted for it.
' '4. That pr01testan t 's land in H·olladay in Salt
La·ke County, upon which he does now and has for
many years used his said water from Big Cottonwood Creek, is not and never has been or will
be used for farming purposes, and is valuable for
and suitable and has been used only for residential purposes and not for farming, and· is and has
been for many years entirely platted to be used
for residences.
"5. That protestant's said land is valuable
Dnly for residential purposes and that all of protestant'.s said water from Big Cottonwood Creek
is necessary for culinary and residential purpo-ses
upon his said land.''
This clearly shows that plaintiffs have no water
rights for Winter use other than for culinary and
domestic purposes, which they have received through
the water pipes furnished by Salt Lake City. If the
plaintiff is seeking to recover damages .by reason of
the order of the court entered on June 23, 1926, he dearly
is not ·entitled to such, as the court order was entirely
void, and if it .should he determined that the ~court order
w'as not void then we are met by this situation. The
court fixed the price and terms for the temporary possession of the water and until the further order of the
court, and if the court had fixed a price f.or the water
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for temporary purposes in a sum that was considered by
the plaintiff Salt Lake City excessive the city would
not be compelled to take the water at the prioe fixed.
In ·other words, it is the universal rule that the condemnor does not have to accept the measure or amount
of damages for property which it seeks to condemn if it
deems the price ·excessive, but the -court having fixed
the price or terms upon which it might take the Moyle
water, the city had the right to rely thereon so long as
it paid the price fixed by the court and there is no evidence or claim by the plaintiffs in this case that they
are seeking damages or compensation because of the city
having failed to .comply with the order of the court. 121
A. L. R. page 1.
Referring to the case of Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch Company vs. Shurtleff, et al., 49 Utah at page 578,
the court lays down this proposition:
' 'It has been elementary doctrine in the arid
region that no one is entitled to a greater quantity
of water for any particular use or purpose than
is reas-onably necessary to supply the needs of
the claimant for the specified purposes. This is
. true regardless of the quantity that has been
used for such purpo~se and the length of time it
may hav·e been us-ed.''
.And again on pag·e 582 the court states :
"Nor can they claim water for culinary,
domestic and livestock purposes .and then devote
it or any considerable part of it to irrigating purposes; that they may not do that by law, as I have
pointed .out, is well settled."
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\Yherein were the Moyles damaged? They had all
the water they could ust• and more for culinary, domestie
and irrigation purposes. The plaintiffs prayed for
$4,150.00 but the court felt they had not prayed for
sufficient, possibly feeling that ~lr. :Moyle was bashful
and did not like to ask for all the money that he was
entitled to and gave him judgment for $350.00 covering
a period of time of whieh there was no allegation covering the same or any pray~r for relief covering the
period from the filing of the complaint to the date of
trial. A novel situation in a lawsuit. No elaim was
filed with Salt Lake City seeking eompensation for the
period of time from the lith day of April, 1939, to date
of trial.
If the court was granting compensation for the reasonab'Ie rental value for the use ·of the property during
the period it is alleged to have been held by the order
of the eourt, on what theory of law then does the court
conclude that the plaintiffs were entitled to· damages
or rent from the time the case was dismissed on the
7th day of January, 1938, to date of

trial~

That period

of time surely could not have been for rental value of
property held by an order ;of the court.
The evidenee in this ease shows that early in 1920
Salt Lake City made applieation to the State Engineer to
Gpange the point of diversion from the Tanner Ditch
Company to the eity's eonduit at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon and to give the Tanner Diteh water
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vertised and the application granted on September 3,
1920. It is .our contention· that all those who wished
to obje-ct to the arrangement and who ·Could be affected
by it were compelled to file their protests before the
State Engineer and if they were dissatisfied, to take their
appeal to the court. It is the only way that Salt Lake
City, who wanted a change of place of diversion of
waters, could compel the matter to be adjudicated before
the expenditure was incurred or commenced; otherwise,
an a.ppropriator could simply refrain from taking any
action, permit a large expenditure and then bring an
injunction suit to enjoin the change of place of diversion
and there by greatly damage and retard progress.
The evidence of Mr. Moyle demonstrates that he
knew of the exchange agreement and knew that the exchange of the company's water for other water would
necessarily mean Lake water in the Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch part ;o.f the time, and he sat supinely by
never protesting the application for the change of the
point of diversion of the waters of the Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditc-h.
I think Section 100-3-3 of the Revised Statutes .of
Utah give.s the State Engineer original jurisdiction for
the determination of the right to change the point of
div·er.sion or use and that anyone dissatisfied with the
State Engineer's de-cision must accept it or appeal to the
District Court. This makes an orderly procedure, gives
everybody an opportunity to be heard and the right to
their day in court and do·es not permit anyone to be what
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we sometimes refer to as a ''dog in a manger.'' In other
words, an applicant for a change of diversion may know
in advance whether he has a right to make the change
and can rely upon the venture ·Of large expenditures i~
effectuating the proposed change of diversion.
AssiGNMENT

OF ERROR

No. 17.

The court erred in admitting in evidence plaintiff's
Exhibit "A". (Abs. 176). Exhibit "A'' consists of the
files in the ·Case .of Salt Lake City vs. Oscar W. Moyl~
and May P. Moyle, filed June 28, 1926, wherein a certain
order was made on J u1y 23, 1926.
The first paragraph of the order is to the .effect that
Salt Lake City is a municipal corporation and enjoys
the right of eminent domain and that the use Salt Lake
City would make of Big Cottonwood water is a more
necessary public use than the use to which the water is
now applied.
Paragraph 2, ''That said Salt Lake City, plaintiff
is hereby authorized to take all the water of Big Cottonwood Cre·ek now flowing in Big Cottonwood T·anner Ditch
and to turn into said Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch
other water suitable for irrigation in lieu and place of
the Big Cottonwood Creek water so taken therefrom
by plaintiff, and it is further ordered that as •soon as
po·s.sible plaintiff shall in water pipes furnish to or make
available for defendant for domestic and culinary purposes sufficient .cre·ek water from Big Cottonwood Creek.
Dated July 23, 1926. ''
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The only purpose of introducing Exhibit "A" would
he if a valid order was ther·ein made upon which Os·car
W. Moyle and May P. Moyle were prejudiced and could
he the basis of a cause of action. We objected to this
as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, which objection was overruled. ( Abs. 25) This order above set out
is absolutely void. A judgment is void when it affirmatively appears from the inspection of the judgment roll
that any one of three following jurisdictional elements are
absent : first, jurisdiction ov·er the person; second, jurisdiction of the .subject matter; and third, judicial power
to render the particular judgment. Winona Oil Co. vs.
Barnes, 200 Pac. 981.
A void judgment 1-s one which shows on face of
record a want of jurisdiction in court assuming to
render judgment, which want of jurisdiction may be
either of the person or of the .subj·ect matter generally,
or a particular question attempted to he de·cided, or
relief assumed to be given. New York Casualty Co.

V'S.

Lawson, 24 S. W. (2nd) 881.
Mr. Freeman in his work on Judgments, Fourth
Edition, 116, in speaking ·of void judgments says that
they must he so for one or more of the £ollowing causes:
one, want of juri.sdiction over the subject matter; two,
want of jurisdiction over the parties, or s.ome of them;
three, want of power to grant the relief contained in the

judgment. Pitkin vs. Burnham, 87 N. W. 160; 55 L. R. A.
280.
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According to the order made by the coutt the city
was to take water of Big rCottonwood Creek which· was
now flowing .in the Big Cottonw·ood Tan:rier Ditch arid
turn into the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch water suitable for irrigation in lieu and place of the Big Cottonwood Creek water so taken therefrom, and furnish culinary water in pipes. I have been unable to find any law
that would give the court authority to make ·such an
order and without authority to make the order, it is void.
AssrGN~IENT OF ERROR

No. 18.

The eourt erred in overruling defendant's ohje,ction
to the following question put to the witness Moyle: ''Q.
And did you use prior to July 23, 1926, did you use all

of the water allotted to you under both sources of title¥"
(Abs. 177)
We think this

~called

for the conclusion of the wit-

ness on one of the important material issues as to how
much water he had been using and not to be concluded
as a general statement of the witness tha:t he had used
all of the water allotted to him under both sourees of
title. vV e think the witness should have been required
to state the use he had made of the water and let the
~court ~conclude as to whether or not he had used all the
water allotted to him and let the court conclude as to
what water he was using, that is from what s·our~ce of
title.
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AssiGNMENT

OF E·RBOR

The court erred in taking

No. 19.

jud~cial

notice of the fact

that the natural flow of Big Cottonwood Creek is suitable water for culinary purposes. (Abs. 177) We think
this wa.s ·entirely erroneous on the part of the court and
it was one of the material issues in the

~case

as to the

value of the water right in question for rental purposes.
It is our position that the court cannot take judicial
notice

~of

contraversiona.l issues.

The evidence in the

·case offered on behalf of defendant by the witnesses
Amber Knight and Lynn M. Thatcher is undisputed, that
the Big Cottonwood Creek water is not suitable for culinary purposes.
In the case of State Ex Rel. Attorney General vs.
Norcross, reported in 112 N. W. at page 40, on page 43
of the opinion the Court had this to say:
''The affirmative position that a .certain river
is navigable may well be judicially noticed in
many instances. That a river is no:t navigable
may sometimes be the subje-c~t of judicial notice;
but considering the various degrees of navigability, and the various kinds of navigation, and the
various appliances for the purpose of navigation,
and the different conditions along different portions of the same river, there mus·t still remain
a large .class of cases in which to determine this
question by judicial notice would deprive the party
averring navigability or non-navigability, as the
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foundation of his right, of the opportunity of trial
and hearing.''
In Varcoe vs. Lee, et al., 181 Pae. 223, quo·ting
the opinion at page 227 :

'

~rom

''The test, therefore, in any particular case
where it is sought to avoid or e:x:cuse the· produc'"
tion of evidence because the fact to be proven is
one of general knowledge and notoriety,' is: (1)
Is the fact one of ·common, everyday kno"'ledge
in that jurisdiction, which everyone of average
intelligence and knowledge of things a·bouf ·him
can be presumed to know¥ and (2) is it certain
and indisrputable¥ If it is, it is a proper ease for
dispensing with evidence, for its production cannot add or aid. On the other hand, we may iwell
repeat, if there is any reasona hie question whatever as to either point, proof should be requi;red. ''
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

No. 20. ( Abs. 177)

The court erred in overruling defendant's objection
to the following question put to the witness M·oyle, :.:

'' Q. And you know what the value of that
water coming through the pi pes of Salt Lake City
is in that vicinity¥ ' '
This error is self-evident. In what 1way can the issues in the instant case be affected by the price Salt Lake
City or anyone else .cha1rges for ·culinary water piped to
a house w:hen the water right in ques1tion was a turn right
for irrigation purposes¥

There is no relationship and

one would have no hearing on the other.
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AssiGNMENT oF EHROR No.

21.

(.A~bs.

177)

The court e1rred in overruling defendant's objection
to the following question put to the witness Weiler:
':Q. Now on the market value of the stock
that you purchased, is that sto{~k more valuable
for- the one-fifth in culinary water or the fourfifths you got in irrigation water~"
'

1

This is obviously erroneous. It could make no difthe witness's opinion was, as to what part
of the ·rights he received from the certifi-cate of stock
made up the value to him, and a water right for culinary
purposes through a pipeline and for water to irrigate
has no relationship to the water rights in litigation in
the; instant case. ·
f~reric~'what

AssiGNMENT OF ERROR No.

22.

The court erred in sustain~ng the plaintiffs' objection to the following question put to the witness Moyle
on cro·ss-examination.
_ _ '' Q. . Would you say that $15.00 per share
~year Was a. r.easonable value for water used
. ; ; :.\ entirely: for irrigation water, irrigating trees. and
,.
S?~e,o~h,~r <~;rops~''.
\ 'i

p.~r

B~~r:i~g in ~ind.: that witness had been testifying p,p_on
direct examination as to what he estimated the rental
value of the 22. 3/4 share~ of water right which.
cl~:'~med, was worth, on ocoss examination by the question asked it was dearly sought to test the knowledge

he
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and competency of the witness and to ascertain wha.t his
value would be for the rental value of water used for
irrigation water, irrigating trees and other crops such
as the

w~tness

had testified that he used the water for,

hut the court would not permit it.
AssiGNMENT OF ERROR No. 23.
The ·court erred in sustaining plaintiffs' objection to
the following question put by the defendant to the witness Macdonald, who was the court's watermaster over
all the waters of Big Cottonwood Canyon Creek.
"·Q. 'y ere you ever served with any order
from the court, telling you that Salt Lake City
had ·eondemned part of the water rights in the Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch, and from then on not
to deliver that water to the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch?''

We think this is a proper question to have answered. It
is our contention that the water could not be condemned
and taken away from the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch
without being approved by the State Engineer and by
an order directing the court commis·sioner to recognize
the change of the right to use and the place of use of the
water of the Big Co.rttonwood Tanner Ditch.
WHEREFORE, by reason of the manifest errors of the
court assigned and relied on for a reversal by the apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

56
p.ellant, it hereby prays that the judgment by the lower
cou~~

be reversed and for such other and further relief

as to this ·court may seem. proper.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R.

CHRISTENSEN'

GERALD IRVINE'

A. P.

KESLER,

Attorneys for AppeUant.
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